INTR71 Global Governance and Forum Post Report Sample

INTR71 Global Governance and Forum Post Report

Task Details

In each topic there will be a discussion forum, focused on an aspect of the learning content. You will be asked to submit a post in response to a prompt and reply to the posts of others. You will submit for assessment a collection of these forum posts and responses, as chosen by you, in line with the requirements below.

Instructions

As a part this assessment you will contribute to a weekly forum discussion by completing the following:

Respond to a stimulus (statement or question) posted by the subject facilitator; you will need to respond at least once each week; each post should be between 200–250 words in length. These initial posts should be posted by Wednesday 23.59 AEDT/AEST each week, to give other students time to respond.

Reply to at least one post each week from other students; each post should be between 200–250 words in length. Submit these responses and any further discussion by Sunday 23.59 AEDT/AEST in the same week as the initial post.

Note that each of the assessable forums are clearly marked as a – there may be additional discussion activities and forums to enhance your understanding of the subject content, yet these are not graded.

You are encouraged to support your ideas with evidence from the readings, prioritising those on the readings list. Please provide references, which are not included in the word count. When posting on a discussion forum, please remember that for the discussions to work and to enhance your learning, we need to create a safe space, where people feel they can openly voice their opinions and share experiences without unwelcome criticism. This means being careful about what you post, your tone and your response to others so that you can build constructive relationships.

At the end of Week 9 (Sunday before 23:59), you will need to choose which of your posts to submit for assessment as follows:

Select the three (3) posts responding to the weekly stimulus you feel best met the assessment criteria. Label each post with the topic number in which it was posted. Select the three (3) posts responding to the posts of other students that you feel you have best met the assessment criteria. Label each post with the topic number in which it was posted, and include the other person (clearly labelled) initial post that you are responding to. You must submit these as one Word document.
The chosen initial posts and responses must come from the same weekly topics (e.g., if your chosen posts come from Topics 2, 3 and 5, the responses must also come from Topics 2, 3, and 5). Obviously, a response that largely repeats your initial post will not score well.

You are encouraged to post regularly and on time beyond the minimum assessment requirements to share and learn from your peers. Contributing consistently in this way is also one of the assessment criteria.

Assessment Criteria

The key criteria are as follows:

Critically address the forum post-stimulus (40%). Provide constructive critique and feedback to others; initial posts, defending your point of view and engaging in a professional discussion (40%).

Contribute in a consistent and thorough manner, with regular and timely posts and responses that go beyond the assessable minimum. Supporting evidence is well used and cited according to APA7 conventions (20%).

Solution

1. Forum Posts

Week 2

A study of PwC Australia's crisis analysis must consider the board of directors' membership, independence, and organizational structure. A well-rounded board with diverse experience encourages sound decision-making and supports effective governance. However, a board that lacks independence or a diverse range of perspectives may be ignorant of severe hazards, leading to poor governance and immoral behaviour (Ratnatunga, 2023). The composition of the board, as well as committees and leadership responsibilities, influence accountability and oversight methods. Independence promotes purpose preference-making, preventing conflicts between interest and immoral action. Because these aspects are most likely to be blamed for governance issues, the PwC Australia case underscores the significance of board membership, structure, and independence in terms of corporate integrity.

The scandal surrounding Qantas Australia for MBA assignment expert exposed flaws in the board's composition, including a lack of independence and experience. To facilitate thorough decision-making, a board should ideally include members with a diverse set of skills, experiences, and education. To provide accountability and oversight, administrators must be a diverse mix of government and non-government professionals (NDTV.com, 2023). Independence encourages fair decision-making by protecting against conflicts of interest. A well-balanced, well-established, and unbiased board ensures stakeholder accountability, risk management, and strategy direction under good governance. On the other side, inadequate governance is typically caused by a board's homogeneity, isolation, and lack of independence, which is a primary cause of oversight errors, ethical shortcomings, and, finally, organizational issues.

Week 3

Institutional shareholders have used their voting power to oppose director resolutions as an interloper governance tool and to express their unhappiness with company alternatives. For example, in 2023, worries over CEO repayment practices and a lack of diversity on the board prompted BlackRock and Vanguard to vote against reappointing numerous directors at a major technology company's annual preferred meeting.

Institutional shareholders, on the other hand, have all started hard against the status quo in an insider governance system like Japan, where bypass shareholdings and tight corporate linkages are common (Lewellen, and Lewellen, 2022). One prominent event happened when the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) objected to a request by a big Japanese firm to raise the size of its board without offering a good justification, showing a shift toward more active shareholder involvement.

The institutional framework has fuelled shareholder activism, which includes regulatory developments that promote shareholder rights, more market transparency, and evolving professional standards that emphasize effective firm governance practices. Furthermore, growing pressure from stakeholders—including institutional traders' clients who are concerned about responsible investing—has prompted institutional shareholders to participate more actively in AGMs and advocate for responsibility, openness, and alignment with societal values.

Week 4

1. Article 1, "Beginner's Guide to the Banking Royal Commission," discusses the Royal Commission's investigations into misconduct, unethical practices, and governance shortcomings inside the banking location, emphasizing the need for robust corporate governance frameworks.

2. The "Banking Royal Commission" discovered a scandal concerning banks charging charges to deceased customers, revealing systemic disasters in internal controls and governance mechanisms inside the banking location, highlighting a dismissal of moral requirements.

3. The Royal Commission was modified into installation due to the acute misconduct inside the financial enterprise, particularly after the Global Financial Crisis, which required complete research to choose out systemic troubles and positioned into effect reforms.

4. Since the Royal Commission, banks have executed reforms consisting of restructuring govt remuneration, enhancing risk control, and strengthening compliance frameworks, at the same time as moreover prioritizing customer-centricity and cultural transformation to rebuild consideration and integrity (Gergis, and Linwood, 2020).

5. The Enron scandal and the GFC have supplied valuable instructions for Australian financial establishments, emphasizing the importance of transparency, obligation, and risk control in corporation governance, as well as the want for regulatory oversight to prevent financial crises.

6. Financial establishments should prioritize moral leadership, install unbiased oversight of our bodies, beautify whistleblower protection, and sell integrity, at the same time regulatory reforms ought to recognise on very last loopholes, growing transparency, and implement stricter results for misconduct.

Week 5

Comparing businesses from one-of-a-type international locations permits for nuanced records of the way employer governance systems and systems replicate the wider industrial corporation structures and cultures of their respective global places. Let's recollect Huawei from China, exemplifying the effect of guanxi, and Toyota from Japan, representative of the keiretsu tool.

Huawei, deeply entrenched in China's guanxi-primarily based corporation way of life, exemplifies an enterprise governance form inspired with the aid of a manner of close relationships and networks (Yan, and Yu, 2021). The employer's founder, Ren Zhengfei, keeps sturdy ties with Chinese authorities’ officials, leveraging guanxi to navigate regulatory hurdles and stable contracts both domestically and internationally. Huawei's governance form is characterised by a centralized preference-making manner, reflecting the hierarchical nature of guanxi networks.

On the opposite hand, Toyota, emblematic of Japan's keiretsu tool, operates inner a community of interconnected groups, vendors, and stakeholders. The Toyota Group encompasses numerous subsidiaries and buddies taking elements closely within the keiretsu framework, fostering long-term relationships and mutual manual. Toyota's governance shape emphasizes consensus-constructing and extended-time period strategic making plans, aligning with the collaborative ethos of keiretsu relationships.

While Huawei and Toyota prioritize relationships and collaboration, their governance structures vary because of the awesome tendencies of guanxi and keiretsu. Huawei's centralized method presents the impact of guanxi networks in China's commercial enterprise organisation panorama, while Toyota's decentralized but interconnected shape mirrors the collaborative nature of Japan's keiretsu tool.

Week 6

While convergence or harmonization of corporation governance structures all through worldwide locations may appear applicable for international consistency and simplicity of compliance, accomplishing it faces high-quality challenges. Cultural, prison, and institutional variations amongst international locations can beat back complete alignment. However, high first-rate components, like transparency and shareholder rights, have seen convergence due to global strain and regulatory reforms. For example, the European Union's directives have stimulated corporate governance codes in member states. Yet, variations persist. For example, Germany's supervisory board model differs considerably from Italy's unmarried-tier board structure (Glawe, et. al., 2021). Despite this, worldwide obligations just like the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance promote convergence. Ultimately, at the same time as some degree of convergence is feasible and beneficial, whole harmonization may be unrealistic given numerous national contexts and regulatory frameworks.

Week 7

In India, Tata Group exemplifies corporation governance practices stimulated through the country's legal framework and cultural norms. Tata adheres to regulatory necessities even as emphasises its own family values and stakeholder pastimes, reflecting India's popularity on familial possession and societal responsibilities. Similarly, in Vietnam, Vinamilk illustrates a blend of state affect and own family management, aligning with the United States of a's socialist orientation and Confucian values of hierarchy and harmony.

Comparatively, Brazil's Petrobras operates within a civil regulation framework but faces worrying situations of corruption and political interference, showcasing weaker governance structures (Raut, et. al., 2023). In Russia, Gazprom showcases the country's dominance, reflecting America’s information of nation control and oligarchic effect.

These rising economies' governance structures vary from Anglo international locations' fashions characterized by shareholder primacy and robust crook frameworks. The evaluation of Anglo Global places emphasis on shareholder rights and market situation, growing economies prioritize country intervention, circle of relative's manipulation, and societal obligations. While Anglo worldwide locations rely on unbiased forums and regulatory oversight, growing economies regularly show off weaker enforcement mechanisms and hundreds a whole lot tons less transparency. Overall, company governance in growing economies presents a complicated interplay of prison, cultural, and historical factors, shaping governance practices wonderful from Anglo norms.

Week 8

In Anglo systems, top-notch examples of remuneration evaluations rejected with the aid of the manner of shareholders encompass those of WPP PLC and Persimmon PLC. WPP faced shareholder backlash in 2018 because of concerns over immoderate authorities' pay, regarding the departure bundle deal for its former CEO, Sir Martin Sorrell. In reaction, WPP engaged in superb shareholder consultation and adjusted its govt pay insurance, together with reducing functionality payouts and enhancing transparency.

Similarly, Persimmon PLC's skilled shareholder rise in 2018 over its authority’s bonus scheme, which ended up being criticized for being overly beneficent and not sufficiently tied to overall performance metrics, specifically amidst troubles over the pleasant of its houses. In reaction, Persimmon undertook a look at its remuneration coverage, introducing ordinary performance conditions and capping destiny bonuses (Das, 2022).

Comparing those rejected Anglo remuneration opinions to those from high-quality governance structures, together with Japan, reveals diverse tactics and outcomes. In Japan, companies like Toshiba Corporation have faced scrutiny over authorities' pay, however shareholder activism and rejections are a lot less commonplace due to cultural norms and tighter control via stakeholders (Hasan, et. al., 2022). However, this does not usually suggest effective board operation. In all instances, effective forums should align government remuneration with general performance, shareholder interests, and prolonged-term sustainability.

Week 9

In Anglo systems, shareholders have rejected remuneration reviews in several instances. One example is the rejection of the remuneration document via shareholders of Wesfarmers in 2018. The vital purpose for the rejection has emerged as the proposed authorities pay form, which shareholders deemed excessive and not efficiently aligned with the company's basic ordinary overall performance. In reaction, Wesfarmers engaged in widespread shareholder consultations to revise its remuneration regulations, which specialize in clearer typical ordinary overall performance metrics and more apparent communication.

Another instance is the rejection of the remuneration record through shareholders of AMP Limited in 2018. The rejection stemmed from concerns concerning authorities' bonuses amidst the commercial enterprise employer's bad financial everyday average overall performance and involvement in misconduct observed with the aid of the Banking Royal Commission (Shirwa, and Onuk, 2020). As a reaction, AMP initiated a complete board and management overhaul, consisting of modifications to govt remuneration policies to align with shareholder interests and company performance.

Comparing those rejected Anglo remuneration opinions to critiques from a wonderful governance device, which includes Japan, wherein shareholder activism has been traditionally limited, famous contrasting dynamics. While unique examples may also moreover variety, the shortage of shareholder rejections in Japan might not necessarily imply powerful board operations. Sometimes, boards in Japan can also face tons less scrutiny due to cultural norms or regulatory environments that discourage shareholder dissent.

2. Global Governance

Post 1: Week 2

The membership, independence, and organizational structure of the board of directors must be considered in a review of PwC Australia's crisis analysis. Effective governance is supported and competent decision-making is encouraged by a well-rounded board with a variety of experiences. But a board devoid of independence or a variety of viewpoints might be blind to serious risks, which could result in bad decision-making and unethical behaviour (Lund, and Pollman, 2021). The structure of the board affects monitoring and accountability procedures, as do committees and leadership roles. Independence encourages the formulation of purpose preferences, averting morally dubious clashes between interests. In terms of corporate integrity, the PwC Australia case highlights the importance of board membership, structure, and independence since these factors are more likely to be held accountable for governance breaches.

The incident involving Qantas Australia highlighted problems in the board's makeup, such as a lack of independence and expertise. To allow for thorough decision-making, a board should ideally comprise members with a wide range of talents, experiences, and education. To offer accountability and supervision, administrators must be a broad group of government and non-government specialists. Independence promotes impartial decision-making by preventing conflicts of interest. A well-balanced, established, and unbiased board promotes stakeholder responsibility, risk management, and strategy direction as part of good governance. On the other hand, ineffective governance is generally caused by a board's homogeneity, isolation, and lack of independence, which is a key cause of oversight errors, ethical inadequacies, and, lastly, organizational challenges.

The discussion board successfully highlights the important function of company governance, mainly inside the context of the PwC Australia catastrophe assessment and the incident related to Qantas Australia. It underscores the importance of board membership, independence, and organizational structure in ensuring powerful desire-making, risk manipulation, and moral conduct within groups. The emphasis on the want for diverse information and independence on the board aligns nicely with the ideas of correct company governance because it promotes obligation, transparency, and stakeholder obligation.

However, at the same time, because the put up efficaciously identifies the significance of governance principles, it lacks intensity in reading the unique governance issues within PwC Australia and Qantas Australia (Larcker, and Tayan, 2020). Providing extra concrete examples or case research to demonstrate how governance failures contributed to the crises may additionally enhance Place Up's effectiveness in demonstrating the importance of suitable employer governance in agency achievement and socially responsible worldwide commercial enterprise corporation exercise.

Additionally, at the same time as the place acknowledges the importance of independence at the board, it can similarly find out the stressful conditions and implications of engaging in independence in taking into consideration every kind of governance structure (Almashhadani, and Almashhadani, 2022). For instance, it can speak about how cultural norms, regulatory environments, and business enterprise structures have an impact on board independence and choice-making techniques at some point in several nations.

Overall, The Place Up effectively addresses the importance of agency governance requirements however wants to advantage of deeper analysis and unique examples to completely display the complexities of corporation governance in special governance structures and its impact on enterprise fulfilment and socially responsible commercial enterprise business enterprise practices in the worldwide market.

Post 2: Week 3

Institutional shareholders have used their voting rights to reject director motions as an interloper governance tool and to express dissatisfaction with business alternatives. For example, in 2023, concerns over CEO repayment practices and a lack of diversity on the board led BlackRock and Vanguard to vote against reappointing multiple directors at a large technology company's annual preferred meeting.

Institutional shareholders, on the other hand, have all begun pushing against the status quo in an insider governance system like Japan, where bypass shareholdings and strong company links are typical (Naciti, et. al., 2022). One notable instance occurred when the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) objected to a proposal by a large Japanese corporation to increase the size of its board without providing a strong rationale, indicating a move toward more active shareholder participation.

The institutional framework has fuelled shareholder activism, with governmental reforms promoting shareholder rights, increased market openness, and rising professional standards emphasizing good corporate governance procedures. Furthermore, increasing pressure from stakeholders, notably institutional traders' customers concerned about responsible investment, has pushed institutional shareholders to participate more actively in AGMs and lobby for accountability, transparency, and alignment with social norms.

The discussion board successfully highlights the position of institutional shareholders in selling organization governance practices through shareholder activism in each outsider and insider governance structure. The examples furnished illustrate how institutional consumers employ their voting rights to hold boards accountable and advise for transparency and obligation.

However, there are elements of the submission that would gain from in addition critique and elaboration. Firstly, at the same time, because the put-up discusses the effect of institutional frameworks on shareholder activism, it can delve deeper into the perfect company governance standards at play in all types of governance systems (Solomon, 2020). For example, it can look at how crook, professional, and moral rules form governance practices in Anglo-American as opposed to insider systems like Japan. A greater positive exam of those standards may also beautify the statistics of approaches to governance structures that impact shareholder activism and company conduct.

Moreover, the place-up must offer a greater nuanced assessment of the effectiveness of shareholder activism in selling pinnacle organization governance. While institutional shareholders' activism is crucial for fostering responsibility and transparency, it is essential to widely known potential boundaries and stressful conditions. For instance, in insider governance structures like Japan, wherein cultural norms and entrenched organization relationships may additionally save you shareholder activism, the effectiveness of institutional engagement may be restrained (Almashhadani, and Almashhadani, 2023). A more important evaluation of those challenges must provide a balanced mindset on the function of institutional shareholders in company governance.

Whilst the publication effectively highlights the importance of shareholder activism in promoting excellent organization governance, it may benefit from a deeper evaluation of the underlying governance ideas and capability boundaries of shareholder activism in specific governance systems. By severely reading the factors, we can better understand the complexities of company governance and its function in shaping commercial organization practices within the global marketplace.

Post 3: Week 5

Comparing firms from unique worldwide locales allows for more sophisticated records of how employer governance systems and systems mimic the larger industrial organization structures and cultures of their distinct global locations. Consider Huawei from China, which exemplifies the power of guanxi, and Toyota from Japan, which represents the keiretsu tool.

Huawei, which is firmly ingrained in China's guanxi-based corporate culture, displays a business governance model built on a network of intimate ties. Ren Zhengfei, the employer's creator, has close contacts with Chinese government officials, using guanxi to bypass regulatory barriers and get contracts both domestically and overseas. Huawei's governance structure is characterized by centralized preference-making, mirroring the hierarchical nature of guanxi networks (Hart, and Zingales, 2022).

Toyota, which represents Japan's keiretsu tool, operates within a network of interrelated entities, vendors, and stakeholders. The Toyota Group has various subsidiaries and partners that operate closely within the keiretsu framework, establishing long-term ties and mutual help. Toyota's governance shape stresses consensus constructing and long-term strategic planning, which aligns with the collaborative mindset of keiretsu ties.

While Huawei and Toyota cost connections and collaboration, their governance structures vary due to the effective forces of guanxi and keiretsu. Huawei's centralized method demonstrates the effect of guanxi networks on China's commercial enterprise business enterprise panorama, whereas Toyota's dispersed but interconnected structure displays the collaborative character of Japan's keiretsu tool (Almashhadani, and Almashhadani, 2022).

The assessment of Huawei and Toyota offers valuable insights into the effect of numerous enterprise business enterprise governance systems on organizational structures and cultures. While every business organization prioritizes connections and collaboration, their governance fashions replicate the splendid traits of guanxi in China and keiretsu in Japan.

Huawei's reliance on guanxi underscores the significance of personal relationships and centralized desire-making in Chinese organisation governance. Ren Zhengfei's close ties with authorities’ officials spotlight the intertwining of corporation and political spheres in China, wherein informal networks facilitate get right of access to resources and opportunities. However, Huawei's centralized approach may additionally increase troubles approximately transparency and duty, as preference-making is cantered inside the hands of some human beings.

On the opportunity hand, Toyota's adherence to the keiretsu version emphasizes prolonged-term partnerships and consensus-constructing an internal community of interconnected entities. This collaborative method aligns with Japan's cultural values of concord and loyalty, fostering stability and mutual guidance among stakeholders (Zaman, et. Al., 2022). However, the keiretsu shape can also pose traumatic conditions in terms of adaptability and innovation, as consensus-pushed preference-making also can need to forestall agility in dynamic market environments.

Critically evaluating one's governance systems, it is crucial to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each method. While guanxi and keiretsu facilitate relationship-building and cooperation, in addition, they present dangers related to nepotism, groupthink, and the absence of transparency. Thus, effective enterprise governance requires a balance between leveraging networks for strategic benefit and enforcing mechanisms to ensure obligation and ethical behaviour.

Furthermore, analysing the outcomes of those governance practices on agency fulfilment and socially responsible business agency behaviour is crucial. Companies must navigate the complexities of world markets at the same time as upholding moral requirements and satisfying their responsibilities to stakeholders. By notably assessing enterprise governance standards and practices in all types of contexts, organizations can decorate their resilience, sustainability, and reputation in an increasingly more interconnected international.

3. References

Almashhadani, H. A., & Almashhadani, M. (2022). An overview of recent developments in corporate governance. International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 11(5), 39-44. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohammed-Almashhadani-2/publication/360682586_An_overview_of_recent_developments_in_corporate_governance/links

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Almashhadani, M., & Almashhadani, A. A. (2023). Corporate Governance Science, Culture and Financial Performance. International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 11(2), 55-60. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohammed-Almashhadani-2/publication/370202170_Corporate_Governance_Science_Culture_and_Financial_Performance/links

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Almashhadani, M., & Almashhadani, H. A. (2022). Does Corporate Governance Improve Corporate Profitability: Reviewing the Role of Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms. International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 11(6), 07-11. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohammed-Almashhadani-2/publication/361379602_Does_Corporate_Governance_Improve_Corporate_Profitability_Reviewing_the_Role

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Das, S. C. (2022). Corporate Governance: Codes, Systems, Standards and Practices. PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd.. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=E-RlEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=How+do+they+reflect+the+countries%26%2339%3B+corporate+

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Gergis, C., and Linwood, S. (2020). Picking up the pieces. Company Director, 36(1), 28-29. https://search.informit.org/doi/pdf/10.3316/informit.444303218278231

Glawe, L., Wagner, H., Glawe, L., & Wagner, H. (2021). The Development Paths and Strategies of Japan, South Korea, and China—A Comparison. The Economic Rise of East Asia: Development Paths of Japan, South Korea, and China, 243-288. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-87128-4_5

Hart, O. D., & Zingales, L. (2022). The new corporate governance (No. w29975). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29975/w29975.pdf

Hasan, A., Aly, D., & Hussainey, K. (2022). Corporate governance and financial reporting quality: a comparative study. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 22(6), 1308-1326. https://eprints.glos.ac.uk/11076/1/10-1108_CG-08-2021-0298.pdf

Larcker, D., & Tayan, B. (2020). Corporate governance matters. FT Press. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BtrPEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT22&dq=corporate+governance&ots=d36LjDvvRq&sig=NHtXXX

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Lewellen, J., & Lewellen, K. (2022). Institutional investors and corporate governance: The incentive to be engaged. The Journal of Finance, 77(1), 213-264. https://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/faculty/jonathan-lewellen/Institutional_incentives.pdf
Lund, D. S., & Pollman, E. (2021). The corporate governance machine. Colum. L. Rev., 121, 2563. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3778&context=faculty_scholarship

Naciti, V., Cesaroni, F., & Pulejo, L. (2022). Corporate governance and sustainability: A review of the existing literature. Journal of Management and Governance, 1-20. https://e-tarjome.com/storage/panel/fileuploads/2022-07-07/1657177265_e16864.pdf

NDTV.com. (2023.). Qantas To Pay $66 Million Fine After ‘Ghost Flights’ Scandal. [online] Available at: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/qantas-to-pay-66-million-fine-after-ghost-flights-scandal-5597706

Ratnatunga, J. (2023). PwC Tax Scandal’s Aftermath: It’s Time to Seriously Regulate the Big 4. Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, 21(1), 17-28. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Janek-
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Raut, N., Bajaj, K., Matte, P., Vhora, M., Kale, V., Umekar, M., & Harane, S. (2023). Building Bridges: Harmonization efforts for enhanced collaboration between developed and developing countries. International Journal Of Drug Regulatory Affairs, 11(3), 68-79. https://www.indianjournals.com/ijor.aspx?target=ijor:ijdra&volume=11&issue=3&article=009

Shirwa, H. A., & Onuk, M. (2020). Corporate governance models and the possibility of future convergence. Journal of Corporate Governance Research, 4(1), 18. https://www.academia.edu/download/71137289/13765.pdf

Solomon, J. (2020). Corporate governance and accountability. John Wiley & Sons. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JAX9DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=corporate+governance&ots=ny-0-zd_-1&sig=5S-qXfGS0bbVWjbtQlKkigvG2WE

Yan, H. D., & Yu, F. L. T. (2021). East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In The Routledge Companion to Asian Family Business (pp. 235-330). Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429342813-17/east-asia-china-hong-kong-japan-south-korea-taiwan-ho-yan-fu-lai-tony-yu
Zaman, R., Jain, T., Samara, G., & Jamali, D. (2022). Corporate governance meets corporate social responsibility: Mapping the interface. Business & Society, 61(3), 690-752. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10675&context=ecuworkspost2013